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Abstract 
This paper discusses the value to milk producers and consumers of segmenting 
the milk market into bST-produced milk and non-bST-produced milk markets, versus 
losing milk consumption from consumers who will not consume bST-produced milk. 
Results indicate that both bST-using producers and non-bST-using producers benefit 
from a segmented market when compared to losing milk markets. Even if market loss 
does not occur, segmenting the market benefits producers not able to effectively use b~T 
and may even benefit bST users if the use of bST significantly shifts the supply curve for 
milk. Non-bST consuming consumers benefit from the availability of non-bST milk, and 
consumers who are indifferent to the use of bST pay about the same price in a segmented 
market. 
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Introduction 
The value of product differentiation to producers is well known in industrial 
organization and in agricultural marketing where market orders operate (firole). In these 
instances, a firm or a coalition of producers are able to differentiate the market for a 
product or commodity such that two separate demands exist, with one demand being 
more inelastic. The result is the enhancement of revenue with often minimal cost of 
differentiation. 
Is product differentiation of value when a coalition of producers cannot be 
formed, such that the differentiation partitions the set of producers into two groups, with 
each group only supplying one of the two markets? This paper looks at that issue in the 
context of bST (bovine Somatotropin) and non-bST-produced milk, but the issue applies 
to any product where there is a real or perceived difference in quality. Other examples 
include organic and nonorganic p'roduce, range-fed versus confinement-produced chick­
ens or eggs, and identity-preserved grains. In all of these cases, there is no direct transfer 
of revenue from one market segment to the other via market orders or other gain-sharing 
mechanisms. Yet, there may be gains to both market segments if farmers producing the 
"traditional" product can shift to an "alternative" product and in the process enhance total 
revenue to both groups of producers. 
In the article, I first discuss the concept of separating the milk market into bST­
produced and non-bST-produced milk consumers and discuss the implications of lost 
markets. To complete the economic analysis, milk supply curves for both bST- and non­
•bST-using producers are presented in both a constant cost and increasing cost industry. 
Finally, numerical results computed under various elasticities and supply curve shifts are 
presented to show the range of impacts. 
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Milk. Demand 
It is assumed that the introduction of bST-produced milk on the market segments 
consumers into those who will buy bST-produced milk as if it were regular milk and 
those who will only consume non-bST-produced milk. This is illustrated in Figure 1 
where the demand curve for milk before the introduction of bST is partitioned into non­
bST and bST milk. It is assumed that at any price the quantity of non-bST milk and bST 
milk demanded equals the quantity of milk demanded before the introduction of bST. In 
Figure 1, ql + q2 ='13. Any difference in total milk consumption post-bST, compared to 
pre-bST, would only be due to the price effects of moving up or down the segmented 
demand curves. 
Partitioning the milk market into bST and non-bST milk requires labeling milk so 
that consumers can identify the differentiated product. At a minimum, this necessitates 
identifying the non-bST-produced milk with a label, since the transference of demand is 
caused by those searching for non-bST-produced milk. The legality and economics of 
labeling are separate issues discussed by Caswell and Padberg. 
The demand functions shown in Figure 1 are also farm gate, rather than final 
demand curves, such that marketing margins are removed. Partitioning the demand 
function into two segments that sum to the original function implies that marketing mar­
gins are not altered by market segmentation. However, labeling and maintaining two 
separate milk markets may increase marketing costs and margins, such that the two seg­
mented markets do not sum to the original nondifferentiated market. Marketing margins 
are discussed by Gardner. The impact of changing marketing margins on farm prices is 
discussed by Fisher. 
Some survey studies have shown that some consumers will stop or reduce their 
• 
consumption of milk if bST is introduced (Kaiser, Scherer and Barbano; Preston, 
McGuirck and Jones). However, since these consumers were willing to consume milk 
before bST, they should be willing to drink non-bST milk. Any reduction in milk 
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Figure 1: Market Segmentation of bST and non-bST Produced Milk 
price of 
milk 
p 
q1 q2 q3 quantity of milk 
• 
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consumed (besides price effects) would be due to protest or lack of confidence that any 
milk labeled as non-bST is indeed non-bST produced. This scenario can be illustrated in 
Figure 2 by a horizontal shift in the vertical axis of the demand schedule and then the 
segmentation of the truncated demand schedule into non-bST and bST-produced milk. It 
is clear in this case that with the rightward shift in the quantity origin that ql + q2 < q3> 
such that at any price less milk will be consumed after bST is introduced. Even if 
consumers do not boycott milk, it is unlikely that every manufactured milk product will 
be segmented into bST and non-bST components simply because the market size of some 
products is insufficient to warrant separation. Some non-bST product consumers may 
substitute non-bST products for these specialty items, but it is unlikely that an additional 
American variety of cheese, for instance, can substitute completely for a more "exotic" 
cheese. Thus, some market loss is likely to occur. 
The Constant Cost Industry 
In order to determine the welfare effects of segmenting the milk market, it is nec­
essary to know the milk supply functions without the introduction of bST, with the use of 
bST, and without the use of bST. The simplest case would be if the dairy industry is a 
constant cost industry. That scenario is represented in Figure 3. The supply curve with 
no bST is shown as a perfectly horizontal line since milk can be produced at a constant 
price. This does not preclude an increasing cost curve for individual producers, but that 
additional producers can enter or leave the industry with the same minimum cost as other 
producers. That minimum cost includes the necessary return to unpaid la~or, manage­
ment, and equity to keep those resources in dairy production. Since the use of bST 
reduces the unit cost of production, the supply curve for bST users is a parallel downward 
• 
shift in the non-bST supply curve. Since producers can freely enter or leave the industry, 
the supply curve for non-bST users is identical to the supply curve before the availability 
ofbST. 
Figure 2: Market Segmentation of bST and non-bST Produced Milk 
with Lost Market . 
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Figure 3: Constant Cost Industry 
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With no market differential, when bST is introduced, the market equilibrium is 
price P3 and quantity q3. Total receipts to the industry is area B + C + D. Since this also 
entails the cost of production, there is no producer surplus earned. Consumer surplus is 
increased, however. 
If the market is differentiated, the receipts of the bST users are B + C, and the 
receipts of the non-bST users are A + B, for total receipts to the sector of A + 2B + C. 
Receipts under market differentiation are greater than without market differentiation if 
A + B > D. Since area C ' (which is a subarea of q plus area B is equal to area D 
because the price and quantities are the same, moving up an inelastic portion of the non­
bST milk demand curve ensures that the areas under the demand curve at the higher 
price, A + B, is greater than areas B + C '. Although total receipts are increased with 
market differentiation, the total quantity of milk produced is lower since q3 > ql + qz. 
The higher price of pz for non-bST-produced milk reduces total demand for all milk but 
increases revenue. The larger revenue is necessary to offset the greater costs of 
producing some milk without bST than producing all milk with bST. Since less quantity 
is produced, fewer dairy producers are necessary if farmers have homogeneous cost 
structures, which is typically assumed with a constant cost industry. Fewer farmers 
would probably be viewed as a negative development by any organization of fanners. 
An Increasing Cost Industry 
Although some dairy facilities can be replicated with identical cost structure, most 
production can only be expanded by bringing into production lower productive land and 
other resources. The implication is an increasing cost industry where the aggregate sup­
ply curve is upward sloping. 
• 
The scenarios of an increasing cost dairy industry is illustrated in Figure 4. That 
figure shows the supply curve before the introduction of bST as So- That curve originates 
at the origin and increases linearly. That is a specific representation to simplify 
• 
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Figure 4: bST Segmentation in an Increasing Cost Industry 
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exposition. An increasing cost industry can also be represented by a nonlinear, 
increasing curve that does not intersect the origin. 
The introduction of bST and complete adoption will shift the supply curve from 
So to Sl' This is a rotation or divergent shift of w percent. A rotational shift is com­
monly used for technological change and simplifies exposition, but it is not universally 
accepted. Parallel or convergent shifts have been proposed for technology change, and 
alters the economic results (Lindner and Jarrett; Wise). The only complete supply curves 
generated with and without bST technology showed irregular shifts in a jagged increasing 
supply curve (Magrath and Tauer). 
The introduction of bST and complete use leads to an equilibrium price of P1 and 
quantity of q1' If the milk market is segmented into bST and non-bST components, the 
supply curves become S2 for non-bST use and S3 for bST use. These curves are gener­
ated by partitioning the pre-bST supply curve, So> into S2 and S3" such that S2 + S3' = So> 
and then by rotating S3' by w percent to produce S3' Thus, So < S2 + S3 < Sl at any price 
p. With the demand curve for milk segmented, the equilibrium conditions are P2' and q2' 
for non-bST milk and P3' and q3' for bST milk. 
However, the above segmentation is only valid if production arbitrage does not 
exist between the two markets. Non-bST users may not be able to move into the bST 
users group because they are not able to generate the bST yields, but bST users could 
stop using (or not use) bST if the price-spread between non-bST and bST milk became 
greater than the cost decrease from using bST. 
A possible arbitrage is shown by movement of the non-bST market to P2 and q2 
and the bST market to P3 and q3' It is assumed that P2 - P3 is the cost advantage of using 
bST. Each quantity of milk moved into the non-bST market reduces the quantity of milk 
­
in the bST market by 100 plus w percent. 
The model illustrated in Figure 4 demonstrates that segmenting the milk market 
not only produces a higher milk price for non-bST users but may also for bST users, 
10 
although the total quantity of milk produced by both groups is less than if the market is 
not segmented. However, these results are dependent upon the elasticities of the demand 
curves and the bST supply curve shift, as will be demonstrated in the application section. 
Consumers who are indifferent to the use of bST may pay a higher price than if the 
market were not segmented. Consumers who refuse to drink bST-produced milk are 
better off at any price with a differentiated market since they then have non-bST milk to 
consume. 
Applications 
To quantify the changes shown in Figure 4 and to determine the ambiguous 
changes in producer prices and surplus, numerical applications were computed using 
various demand elasticities and supply curve shifts. A demand elasticity for milk of 
approximately -.3 and lower is common in the literature (Kaiser, Streeter and Liu). 
Blayney and Mittelhammer estimated a supply elasticity of .89, but Chavas, Kraus and 
Jesse report elasticities over 2.0, and estimates as low as .29 are common from 
adjustment cost models (Weersink). A supply curve from the origin implies a supply 
elasticity of 1.0. Alternative elasticities will be used later. The 1986-1990 national 
average price of milk was $12.92 per cwt., and 149.42 billion pounds were consumed. 
Given that information and a demand elasticity of milk of -.3 and a supply elasticity of 
1.0, linear demand and supply functions were constructed. The aggregate demand 
function for milk is P =55.9867 - .28820. The aggregate supply function for milk is P = 
.08650. 
In a review of the consumer surveys to bST milk, Smith and Warland conclude 
that 11.3 percent of respondents would stop drinking milk produced using bST. (A small 
• 
percentage would also reduce their consumption.) Thus, the market demand was parti­
tioned into 11.3 percent non-bST and 88.7 percent bST milk at every price. That pro­
duced a demand function for non-bST-produced milk ofPN=55.9867 - 2.55OQN and for 
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other milk (bS1) of PB = 55.9867 - .3249OB• The demand function for milk if 11.3 per­
cent of the market is simply lost is 51.1201 - .28820. 
bST impact studies have used various yield increases and cost reductions (Fallert 
et al.). I elected to use a bST cost reduction of 8 percent. This means that at any level of 
aggregate milk production the cost of producing that milk using bST is 8 percent lower 
than if that milk were produced without the use of bST. The supply function for bST­
produced milk becomes PB = .079580B• A cost reduction of 20 percent is used later. 
Using these values, the model illustrated by Figure 4 was empirically solved with 
and without a segmented market. Appendix A contains a listing of the GAUSS program 
used to solve for equilibrium price and quantity values and to calculate producer and con­
sumer surpluses. The results are summarized in Table 1. Before bST, the price of milk is 
$12.92 per cwt., and the quantity ofmilk produced is 149.42 billion pounds. Producer 
surplus is 965 units; consumer surplus is 3,218 units. The introduction of bST, complete 
adoption and a nonsegmented milk market produces Pl = $12.11 per cwt. and ql = 
152.23 billion pounds. Producer surplus is reduced to 922, and consumer surplus is 
increased to 3,340. 
Segmenting the market with arbitrage produces P3 = $12.09 and q3 = 135.08 for 
the bST-produced milk, with producer surplus of 817, and P2 =13.06 and q2 =16.83 
for the non-bST-produced milk with producer surplus of 110. This is a total producer 
surplus of 927, which is larger than the producer surplus with a nonsegmented market. 
The bST users receive a price that is $.03 lower than if the market was not segmented, 
but the non-bST users receive a price that is even higher than the price before bST is 
introduced. The average price received by all producers is $12.20, with total output. of 
151.92 billion ~ounds. 
• 
.. 
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Table 1. Impact of bST-Produced Milk on the Milk Market with a Divergent
 
(Pivotal) Shift in the Supply Curve 
Price Quantity Producer 
(S/ewt.) (bill. lbs.) surplus 
--- En =-.3 Es = 1.00 w = .08 --­
Before bST 12.92 149.42 965 
After bST 12.11 152.23 922 
Market loss 11.06 139.00 768 
Market segmentation 
Non-bST 13.06 16.83 110 
bST 12.09 135.08 817 
Total 12.20 151.92 927 
--- ED = -.2 Es = 1.00 w = .20 --­
Before bST 12.92 149.42 965 
AfterbST 10.69 154.57 826 
Market loss 9.69 140.02 678 
Market segmentation 
Non-bST 12.84 16.91 109 
bST 10.70 137.09 733 
Total 10.94 153.99 840 
--- ED = -.5 Es = .25 w = .08 --­
Before bST 12.92 149.42 1689 
AfterbST 12.56 151.52 1655 
Market loss 10.66 145.58 1374 
Market segmentation 
Non-bST 13.48 16.52 194 
bST 12.49 134.76 1464 
Total 12.60 151.28 1658 
--- En = -.2 Es = 2.00 w = .20 --­
Before bST 12.92 149.42 483 
After bST 10.53 154.95 415 
Market loss 9.99 139.32 336 
Market segmentation 
Non-bST 12.67 16.95 53 
bST 10.56 137.39 370 
Total 10.79 154.34 423 
Consumer 
surplus 
3218 
3340 
2784 
361 
2965 
3326 
4826 
5165 
4238 
547 
4580 
5127 
1931 
1985 
1833 
209 
1770 
1979 
4826 
5190 
4196 
550 
4600 
5150 
-
.­
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In contrast, if instead of segmenting the markett 11.3 percent of the demand is 
lostt the impact on producers is ·significant. The price of milk falls to $11.06 and only 
139 billion pounds are consumed. Producer surplus falls to 768. Although milk con­
sumers buy milk at a much lower pricet the exodus of milk consumers because of bST 
reduces consumer surplus to 2t784. 
The same general results are obtained when the original demand elasticity is -.2t 
-.4t or -.5 (not shown). Howevert with a more significant supply curve rotation of .20 
rather than .08t and a demand elasticity of -.2t bST-using producers experience a slightly 
higher milk price of $10.70 with a segmented market than the $10.69 they would receive 
with a nonsegmented market. If the supply curve shift is .25t then the price premium for 
bST users in a segmented market is 3 cents rather than 1 cent (not shown). In any caset 
all producers are better off than losing a portion of the milk markett and non-bST 
producers receive a higher price when they can supply a non-bST market rather than 
compete in the bST market. In fact, non-bST users may receive a higher price for their 
milk than they received pre-bST. 
Also reported in Table 1 are results with a supply elasticity of 2 and of .25 at the 
equilibrium price of $12.92 and quantity of 149.42. Since these linear supply curves do 
not intersect the origint the impact of bST on these curves were implemented by shifting 
the intercepts down by multiplying by (l-w) and reducing the slope by multiplying by (1­
w). At any aggregate milk quantitYt bST milk can be produced at a cost w percent lower 
than non-bST milk. 
The results are similar to the results under a supply elasticity of one. The 
introduction of bST lowers the milk pricet and the loss of markets reduces the price 
further. Segmenting the milk market into bST and non-bST segments significantly 
• 
increases the price for non-bST users -- in the first case (third scenario in Table 1) 
actually increasing the milk price above the level before the introduction of bST. In a 
segmented market, bST users may again experience a higher milk price with a segmented 
14 
market compared to a nonsegmented bST market as illustrated by the fourth scenario in 
Table 1. 
Conclusions 
If some consumers will not buy milk produced with bST, the opportunity to seg­
ment the market into bST- and non-bST-produced milk benefits all producers since both 
bST users and nonusers receive a higher milk price than if the market were nonseg­
mented. Their producer surplus is higher with a segmented market, but it is still lower 
than if bST were not introduced. This assumes that some consumers do not stop buying 
milk altogether. If, instead of segmenting the market, the consumers who do not wish to 
consume bST-produced milk simply stop buying milk, the impact on producers is signifi­
cant, with a much lower milk price and producer surplus. It appears that non-bST-using 
producers will always benefit from a segmented market, in some circumstances earning a 
higher price than even before bST is introduced. Producers using bST may experience a 
slightly higher or lower price if the market is segmented, depending upon the 
circumstances. 
This analysis assumes a national milk market, although regional markets with 
integration exist in the U.S. The marketing costs of segmenting the milk market was 
assumed identical to a single market. However, the marketing system must bear the cost 
of keeping bST- and non-bST-produced milk differentiated. Those costs and how they 
are absorbed need to be investigated. Large costs may reduce the benefits shown here. 
The permanence of the demand differentiation is another unknown. As time passes, non­
bST milk drinkers may migrate to bST milk consumption if they become convinced that 
bST-produced milk is healthy to drink. 
• 
Finally, the role of marketing orders or government support programs in a seg­
mented market were not incorporated into the analysis. Most ~ilk in the U.S. is sold in 
marketing orders where producers receive a blended milk price based upon the disposi­
15 
tion of milk within their order rather than the use of their own specific milk to the fluid or 
processed market. In addition, a floor is placed on milk prices by government's purchase 
of milk products. How market order and support programs would operate in a segmented 
milk market needs to be explored if a segmented market is likely. However, it is not 
unrealistic to think that if bST is approved then milk is milk in the government programs, 
regardless of whether or not it was produced using bST technology. 
•
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/* »---> BST Paqe 1 */ 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. is quan., y[2] is price */
34. 
35. all with bst */ 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. /* Aqain, only bST produced milk but with market loss */ 
41. 
42. proc hsys(z)1 
43. local hl,h21 
44. /* demand curve lossing some ot the milk market, z[l] is quan., Z[2] is 
45. hl - demloss+demslope*z[1]-z[2] 1
 
46. /* supply curve tor bST milk */ 
47. h2 - conbst+slopebst*z[1]-z[2]; 
48. retp(hllh2)1
49. endp; 
50. • 
51. /* This section allows tor both bST and non-bST milk markets */ 
52. 
53. proc tsys(x) 1
 
54. local fl,t2,t3,t4,t51 
55. /* demand curve tor bst milk, x[l] is quantity, x[2] is price */ 
21 
/* »---> BST Page 2 */ 
56. fl - demcon+(demslope/(1-10ss»*x[1]-X[2]; 
57. /* demand curve for non-bst milk, x[3] is quan. x[4] is price */ 
58. f2 - demcon+(demslope/loss)*X[3]-X[4]; 
59. /* price of bst milk lower by cost of production */ 
60. f3 - x[4]-(1+cost)*x[2]; 
61. /* supply curve for bst produced milk weighted by X[5] */ 
62. f4 - conbst+slopebst*X[1]/(1-X[5])-x[2]; 
63. /* supply curve for non-bst produced milk weighted by X[5] */ 
64. f5 - supcon+supslope*x[3]/X[5]-x[4];
65. retp(fllf2If3If4If5);
66. endp; 
67. 
68. /* Initial conditions to start a solution */ 
69. 
70. yO - { 140, 13 ); 
71. xO - { 140, 13, 10, 14, .1 ) 1 
72. 
73. output file - bstseg.out reset; 
74. 
75. /* Solving the three models using nonlinear routine nlsys */ 
76. 
77. { y,g,r,scode ) - nlprt(nlsys(&gsys,yO»1 
78. nlset; 
79. { z,h,e,dcode ) - nlprt(nlsys(&hsys,yO»; 
80. nlsetl 
81. { x,f,j,tcode ) - nlprt(nlsys(&fsys,xO»; 
82. 
83. /* consumer surplus before bst */ 
84. csb - (demcon-p)*q/2; 
85. /* producer surplus before bst */ 
86. if supcon >- 0; 
87. psb - (p-supcon)*q/2; 
88. else; 
89. psb - (p-supcon)*q/2-((q/(p-supcon»*(-supcon»*(-supcon/2); 
90. endif; 
91. 
92. /* consumer surplus after bst before market segmentation */ 
93. csa - (demcon-y[2])*y[1]/2; 
94. /* producer surplus after bst before market segmentation */ 
95. if supcon >- 0; 
96. psa - (y[2]-conbst)*y[1]/2; 
97. else; 
98. psa - ((y[2]-conbst)*y[1]/2)-((y[1]/(y[2]-conbst»*(-conbst)*(-conbst/2) 
99. endif; 
100. 
101. /* consumer surplus after market loss */ 
102. cs10ss - (demloss-z[2])*z[1]/2;
103. /* producer surplus after market loss */ 
104. if supcon >- 0; 
105. ps10ss - (z[2]-conbst)*Z[1]/2; 
106. else; 
107. ps10ss - ((Z[2]-conbst)*z[1]/2)-((Z[1]/(z[2]-conbst»*(-conbst)*(-conbs ­
108. endif; 
109. 
110. /* consumer surplus with bst market segmentation, no bst first */ 
---------------------------------------------
111. 
112. 
113. 
114. 
115. 
116. 
117. 
118. 
119. 
120. 
121. 
122. 
123. 
124. 
125. 
126. 
127. 
128. 
129. 
130. 
131. 
132. 
133. 
134. 
135. 
136. 
137. 
138. 
139. 
140. 
141. 
142. 
143. 
144. 
145. 
146. 
147. 
148. 
149. 
150. 
151. 
152. 
153. 
154. 
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1* »---> BST Paqe 3 *1 
csan - (demcon-x[4])*x[3]/2;
 
csab - (demcon-x[2])*x[1]/2;
 
csat - csan+csab;

1* producer surplus with market seqmentaion, first no bst users *1
 
if supcon >- 0;
 
psan - (x[4]-supcon)*x[3]/2;

else;
 
psan - (x[4]-supcon)*x[3]/2-((x[3]/(x[4]-supcon»*(-supcon)*(-supcon/2»

endif;
 
if supcon >- 0;
 
psab - (X[2]-conbst)*X[1]/2;

else;
 
psab - (x[2]-conbst)*x[1]/2-((x[1]/(x[2]-conbst»*(-conbst)*(-conbst/2»

endif;
 
psat-psan+psab;
 
1* Printout of the results *1 
format lRO 15,2:
 
lprint " DIVERGENT (PIVOTAL) SHIFT IN THE SUPPLY FROM BST ":
 
lprint "Before bst" p q psb csb: 
lprint; 
lprint " 
" Prod. 
.. " 
Surplus" " 
Price" " 
Cons. Surplus" ; 
.Quantity" 
lprint " 
lprint "After bst "y[2] yell psa csa:
 
lprint "Market loss" z[2] z[l] psloss csloss:
 
lprint "Market seqmentation";
 
lprint " No-bST " x[4] x[3] psan csan;
 
lprint " bST " x[2] x[l] psab csab;
 
totalq - x[1]+x[3];

weiqhedp a (x[4]*x[3]+x[2]*x[1])/totalq;

lprint " Total " weiqhedp totalq psat csat;
 
lprintformat lRO,,----------------------------------------------------------------12,4; 
lprint "demand elasticity 
lprint "supply elasticity 
lprint "bST cost advantaqe
lprint "proportion no-bST 
lprint ; 
output off; 
"eld; 
"els; 
" cost; 
"loss; 
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